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Abstract 
The con text within which refugee service 
providers work shapes and constrains 
their florts. Those legal, political,fiscal, 
and managerial influences in the Cana- 
dian con text have tended to fmce the crea- 
tion of refugee service networks. This 
article considers some of the factors that 
have brought about this network ap- 
proach to refugee service delive y, but, 
most importantly, i t  seeks to understand 
what the implications of that develop- 
ment are for service providers and the 
communities they serve. This articlear- 
gues that s m k e  networks can be flective 
and eficien t in  meeting refugee needs, 
but it isessential to beawareof thespecial 
challenges posed by network manage- 
ment. Thosechallenges not only concern 
how service providers work together and 
deal with refugees and other immigran ts, 
but also alert them to theimpact they can 
have inside refugee service NGOs. 
Le contextedans lequel les presta taires de 
services aux r@giks travaillen t, faconne 
et restreint leurs efiorts. Ces influences 
lkgales, politiques,fiscales et administra- 
tives duns le contexte canadien, ont eu 
tendance a pousser vers la crkation de 
rkseaux de services aux rkfugiks. Cet ar- 
ticle ktudie certains des facteurs qui ont 
amenk cette approche de prestation de 
services aux re'fugiks par rkseau. Mais, 
avant tout, il cherche li comprendre 
quelles sont les implications de ce 
dkveloppernent pour, d'une part, les 
prestataires deseruices et, de l'autre, pour 
les communautks qu'ils seruent. L'article 
soutient que les rkseaux de services 
peuvent &re utiles et eficaces pour 
ripondre aux besoins des r@gie's, mais 
qu'il faut absolumen t &re conscien t des 
dkfis particuliers que comporte lugestion 
de ces rkseaux. Ces dkfis ne concernent 
pas seulement la facon dont les 
presta taires de services travaillen t de 
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concert et s'occupent des rkfugiks et 
d'autres immigrks. 11 estaussi important 
d'2tre vigilant quant l'impact qu'ils 
peuvent avoir au sein des O N G  
spe'cialiskes duns les services aux  
rkfugiks. 
Introduction 
Those of us who study refugee issues 
come to Canada to learn. For many 
years, Canadians have taught other 
nations a great dealby their willingness 
toopen their doors to refugees and their 
generosity in seeking to provide serv- 
ices for them as the new arrivals become 
full members of the Canadian society. 
The creativity of the refugee servicecom- 
munity in Canada has provided inno- 
vative and effective models for 
organizations and programmes that 
can better assist refugees as well other 
new Canadians. The dedicated corps of 
people, many of them whom were refu- 
gees and immigrants themselves, has 
demonstrated to the rest of us how en- 
ergy and commitment can make a dra- 
matic difference in the people we all 
ultimately seek to serve the larger soci- 
ety. These are among the reasons why 
the Canadian people were collectively 
awarded the Nansen Medal (named 
after Fridtjof Nansen, the first High 
Commissioner for Refugees under the 
League of Nations) for service to refu- 
gees. This was the first time an entire 
nation was honoured. 
Of course, in light of all that, when 
challenges emerge in the Canadian refu- 
gee policy and service delivery system, 
the rest of us should be concerned and 
seek to learn from the way those chal- 
lenges are met. It is also important to 
understand the impact of the decisions 
that are taken withincanada, for just as 
it has been a leader in so many aspects 
of refugee service, the situation in 
Canada serves as a warning to others of 
what lies in the horizon of this field. 
The challenge of providing refugee 
services rests in part, as the other arti- 
cles in this symposium demonstrate, on 
the level of professional practice - the 
state of the art in refugee service deliv- 
ery. But no matter how creative, how 
expert, or how professional the service 
providers may be, their ability to suc- 
cessfully deliver support for refugees 
who arrive in Canada depends, as it 
does in other countries, upon a variety 
of issues that they do not control. The 
context within which service providers 
and the refugee families they seek to 
assist must live and workmatters. The 
legal, political, fiscal and management 
challenges presented by the environ- 
ment in which the refugee challenge 
mustbemet calls upon the very best that 
dedicated professionals can deliver. Yet 
they also place boundaries on what can 
be accomplished and the methods that 
can be used to achieve their goals on 
behalf of the people they serve. 
An examination of those factors over 
the past decade in Canada indicates a 
number of important trends. One of the 
factors is the tendency for changing 
policy and resource constraints to alter 
the working relationships between gov- 
ernment and nongovernmental organi- 
zations (NGOs) that provide refugee 
services and among those NGOs as 
well. In particular, these dynamics have 
tended to force the creation of refugee 
servicenetworks. This article considers 
some of the factors that have brought 
about this change to a network ap- 
proach in the refugee service delivery 
system,but most importantly, it seeks to 
understand what the implications of 
that development are for service provid- 
ers and the communities they serve. 
Following these arguments that have 
been presented, the thesis that emerges 
is as follows: while service networks 
canbe effective and efficient inmeeting 
refugee needs, it is a kind of organiza- 
tion that requires ahigh degree of aware- 
ness of the special challenges posed by 
network management and a commit- 
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ment of resources to meet those chal- 
lenges. Among these challenges is the 
need to be alert to the impact they can 
have on the NGOs which are critical to 
the system and the differences that exist 
between network operations in the pri- 
vate f or-profitbusiness community and 
the not-for-profit public service sector. 
The discussion will turn first to the 
forces that are shaping the service net- 
works. It will then consider thenetwork 
concept in action. Finally, it will address 
the implications of the move to interde- 
pendent service networks. 
The Critical Forces Shaping 
Refugee Service Networks 
Canada has increasingly felt a number 
of forces that have been shapingrefugee 
policy, the resources available to serve 
new arrivals and the context within 
which they and their service providers 
must live and work. These are dynamics 
that have been building in many other 
countries, most notably the E.U. nations 
and the United States, even before some 
of the most recent changes in Canada. 
And while Canada remains steadfast in 
declaring its commitment to the hu- 
manitarian principles that have made it 
a world leader in this field, it would be 
unrealistic to suggest that these politi- 
cal, economic, and legal stresses have 
not brought increased stress to the effort 
to provide refugee services. 
Political Pressures to Emphsize 
Enforcement and Protection of 
Borders 
There is no doubt that the smuggling 
incidents in recent years have captured 
agreat dealof attention. Itwas one thing 
when authorities apprehended small 
numbers of people attempting illegal 
entries at various border points. How- 
ever, the situation took on a new and 
ominous quality when Canadian and 
U.S. officials found people in cargo con- 
tainers at West Coast ports. This oc- 
curred shortly after the highly 
publicized cases in which Canadian 
agencies, civilian and military, were 
called in to track and then to deal with 
vessels, better described as hulks than 
as ships, carrying immigrants bound for 
British Columbia. Since these events 
began in the summer of 1999, Citizen- 
ship and Immigration M e k r  Elinor 
Caplan has k n  at pains to answer 
demands for more edorcement and 
strongereffortstoexclade illegal immi- 
grants.' Sadly, when such demands 
arise in Canada or elsewhere, the voices 
raising them are rarely sensitive to the 
distinctions between legitimate refu- 
gees who come by some troublesome 
means or others. That is particularly 
true if MPs and party officials see an 
opportunity for political gaininexploit- 
ing public fear and anger. It is all the 
more troublesome if such events are al- 
lowed to fuel already growing anti-im- 
migrant sentiment. And although 
Caplan has stressed the government's 
intention to maintain its immigration 
target at 1% of population and its expec- 
tations for 25,000 refugee arrivals in 
2000, she has repeatedly found it neces- 
sary to respond to fears and frustra- 
tions. 
I understand the concerns of many 
Canadians about these recent marine 
arrivals. I want to make it clear that 
I deplore the actions of human smug- 
glers. I am also deeply concerned 
about the increasing number of peo- 
ple who turn to the criminal element 
in choosing to enter Canada surrep- 
titiously and illegally. . . . 
Criminal actions such as these only 
confirm the need to change our leg- 
islation. Early this year, the govern- 
ment proposed new legislative 
directions on immigration and refu- 
gee policy. These directions include 
enhancing our ability to intercept il- 
legal migrants abroad, stiffer penal- 
ties for those who contravene our 
laws, and the increased use of deten- 
tion of p e ~ p l e . ~  
These pressures have also meant that 
many government statements about 
refugees begin with a recognition of the 
importance of the immigrant commu- 
nity and the humanitarian commitment 
to assist refugees, but are frequently 
qualified. "Canadian are compassion- 
ate andgenerous. That hasnot changed. 
But Canadians willnot be taken advan- 
tage of. This I can assure YOU." "Our 
Government will continue to accept 
refugees, while at the same time take 
strong measures to stem the flow of 
those who try to abuse our refugee 
program~ne."~ I want to keep the front 
door to this country open, but I know 
that to do so, we've got tomake sure that 
we close the back d ~ o r . " ~  
Much of Caplan's term has been 
spent addressing reactions tothe illegal 
ships smuggling people in cargo con- 
tainer, but these high profile events did 
not mark the beginning of the reaction 
against refugees and immigrants. By 
the mid-1990s popular media outlets 
reported changing attitudes across 
Canada, and particularly in the West. 
Clearly, Canada is not alone in facing 
such political pressures. Indeed, it is 
following trends that have been devel- 
oping for some time in Europe and the 
United States. In these countries, the 
humanitarian focus for refugee policy 
has lost ground to the economic, foreign 
policy, and domestic politics foci and 
the general trend has been the attempt 
to view refugee issues as matters to be 
dealt with abroad, miles away from 
one's own country, if possible, or as 
borderproblems if ne~essary.~ This ef- 
fort to shift both the focus and locus of 
refugee policy is clear despite long- 
standing commitments by these coun- 
tries to the 1951 United Nations 
Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees7 and the 1967Protocol Relat- 
ing to the Status of Refugees.$ 
There have been three obvious im- 
pactsthatemerged from this trend. First, 
there has been atendency to discourage 
themovement of refugees to these coun- 
tries. Second, policymak-ing has tended 
to emphasize a law enforcement effort 
aimed at blocking illegal immigrants in 
which refugees have come to be seen as 
another type of immigrant or removing 
those who seem tohave slippedthrough 
thenet. Third, this focus on borders and 
beyond, and the increasing importance 
of law enforcement has tended to sup- 
port increased attention to resource 
needs for enforcement with decreasing 
concern for theneeds of refugee service 
programmes. 
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The Economic Pressures Of 
Stressful Times, Market Pressures, 
and Declining Support for the 
Social Safe0 Net 
As witnessed around the world at other 
times and in many places, economics 
played a role in the growing tensions 
around refugee policy, including settle- 
ment services. Hard times often breed 
increases in scape-goating. Certainly, 
the United States provides a particu- 
larly glaring history of this kind of be- 
haviour, but it is not the only place 
where refugees and other immigrants 
have been falsely accused of taking jobs 
away fromnatives. Of course, as Minis- 
ter Caplan has reminded Canadians: 
One reason for this tolerance and 
compassion is that we are a nation of 
i-igants and refugees. Consider 
that today, forty-six members of the 
House of Commons were born out- 
side of Canada. Our new Governor 
General, Adrienne Clarkson, came to 
Canada as a refugee during the Sec- 
ond World War. 
My grandparents were immigrants, 
and so were many of yours. Indeed, 
apart from our aboriginal popula- 
tion, ALL Canadians are descended 
from immigrants or refugees. It's 
really just a matter of ~eniority.~ 
But the anti-refugee and anti-immi- 
grant sentiment predated the events 
that have taken Caplan's attention 
since she acquired her portfolio. The 
economic stresses of the 1980s and 
1990s had two important conse- 
quences. First, they have played a role 
in a constrained but real reaction 
against generous refugee policies. In 
January 1993, MacClean's reported the 
results of aMaclean's/CTV survey, in- 
dicating that " regardless of age, in- 
come or level of education," four of five 
respondents considered increased im- 
migration "'bad,' 'very bad' or simply 'a 
fact of life.'" And, thereport added that 
there was a clear connection between 
those attitudes and the state of the 
economy. 
Thirty-two per cent of those who 
were pessimistic about the economy 
had negative opinions of visible mi- 
norities, while only 26 per cent of 
those who felt the economy was im- 
proving said that immigrants from 
Asia, the West Indies and other parts 
of the Third World were bad for 
Canada.lo 
Second, the dramatic economic cut- 
back decisions taken by Ottawa in re- 
sponse to the economic challenges 
meant reduced support for a wide vari- 
ety of social programmes, including 
those serving refugees and immigrants. 
The federal government dramatically 
cut a variety of programmes, including 
significant reductions in transfer pay- 
ments to the provinces. So significant 
were the federal rollbacks that even a 
major effort in 1999 to put funds back 
into medical care through the Canada 
Health and Social Transfer (CHST) still 
did not restore transfer payments for 
these programmes to quite the level they 
had been despite the return of a better 
financial situation. 
In the face of those cuts, provincial 
governments in turn trimmed many of 
their programmes and in some cases 
those provincial changes were even 
more drastic than the changes in Ot- 
tawa. Localschoolboards, likeOttawa/ 
Carleton debated resolutions to the pro- 
vincial ministry asking for reconsidera- 
tion of major cuts in special education 
and increasing restrictions on eligibil- 
ity for English as a second language 
programmes, effectively cutting those 
programmes. In British Columbia, the 
Union of Municipalities published a 
study by an independent firm on the 
relationship between federal cuts to 
provinces and provincial cuts to mu- 
nicipalities. It found that by any meas- 
ure, the cutsby the provinces were even 
more severe than the cuts from Ottawa. 
In 1996, BC Municipalities received 
$209 million in general fund transfer 
payments from the Province. This 
was cut to $129 million in 1997 and 
1998 as a result of the changes an- 
nounced by the Province at the end of 
1996. This is a 38% reduction in the 
level of transfer payments. 
In December 1998, the Province an- 
nounced a further reduction in mu- 
nicipal transfer payments of $39 
million, to be effective in 1999. This 
will reduce the general fund transfer 
payments to $90 million. This is a fur- 
ther 30% reduction from the 1998 
level. And it will be implemented in 
one year." 
In addition to these cuts in support 
for social programmes spending in the 
provinces and at the local government 
level, Ottawa cut budgets in federalmin- 
istries, including in Citizenship and Irn- 
migration Canada (CIC). Planned 
spendingbetween 1998-99 and 2001-02 
is scheduled to decline by 9.6% in nomi- 
nal dollars while continuing work lev- 
els at approximately the same number of 
immigrants and refugees. If one as- 
sumes a very conservative 3% inflation 
figure, the real dollar impact would be 
more than 17.3% reduction over that 
same period.12 These cuts come at a time 
when CIC is asked to be more respon- 
sive, faster, and more active than ever 
before. Since this was written, funds 
were added to theCICbudget but largely 
for enforcement. 
And, of course, all of these cuts hit 
hardest those at the end of the financial 
pipeline, the refugees and the NGOs 
that provide their services. The Cana- 
dian Council for Refugees (CCR) 
summed up the situation as follows: 
In recent years, the economic climate 
and the deficit reduc- 
tion priorities have had their impact 
on refugees, always among the most 
vulnerable when time comes for cut 
back. Newlv arrived in Canada and 
withvery limited resources, refugees 
and other immigrants have faced 
reduced services from the Immigra- 
tion Department, cuts in social assist- 
ance and job training programmes, 
reduced medical coverage and legal 
aid coverage, increased fees in many 
areas . . . . Organizations offering 
services to refugees and immigrants 
have had to respond to these new 
difficulties faced by their clients, at 
the same time that they are them- 
selves often suffering funding cut- 
backs.13 
A New and Even More Demanding 
Legal Context for Refugee Service 
Agencies 
The other element that has been dy- 
namic and of major importance for refu- 
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gee service agencies is the changing le- 
gal context. There have been two critical 
dimensions to the changes in this field. 
First, there have been the increasing 
demands for intensified enforcement 
efforts. Second, Canada has been in a 
major effort at policy change. 
The earlier discussion of the re- 
sponse to the British Columbia events 
underscored the government's empha- 
sis on enforcement and attempts to 
speed up resulting adjudications, lead- 
ing to faster exclusions if they are 
deemed appropriate. The pressures to 
intenslfy these enforcement efforts were 
exacerbated by U.S. criticisms that Ca- 
nadian policies and lax enforcement 
efforts had made it a haven for terrorists. 
Even Canadian voices have been heard 
supporting such charges.14 
However, long before the recent pres- 
suresbeganbuilding in order to tighten 
Canadian policy and practices for refu- 
gees and immigrants, the trend in that 
direction was well established. The 
pressures for change came both from 
within Canada and from developments 
in other countries. 
International trends toward restrict- 
ing asylum and speeding up exclusions 
of those who do manage to enter borders 
have been underway for some time. Well 
before the Maastricht Treaty went into 
force, E.U. countries had been moving 
toward more restrictive refugee law and 
legal process. Ironically, the changing 
laws governing border control can be 
traced back to the time of the efforts by 
E.U. countries to open their borders to 
one another in order to ease commercial 
relations. The Netherlands, Luxem- 
bourg and Belgiumbeganefforts to open 
their borders to each other in 1960. 
France and Germany entered into a 
similar agreement in 1984 and then 
joined their predecessors in an accord 
signed in Schengen, Luxembourg 
which have since come to be known as 
the Schengen Agreements.15 Eventu- 
ally, over a dozen countries, some of 
which were E.U. nations and others, 
joined together in the SchengenConven- 
tion and the Schengen Implementation 
Agreement. These agreements involved 
cooperation on cross-border criminal 
justice concerns as well as information 
sharing and cooperation among police 
and judicial officials in the signatory 
countries. They also required harmoni- 
zation of refugee policies to block what 
was termed asylum shopping. With this 
approach of 1992, the E.U. countries en- 
tered into the Dublin Convention in 
1990 which incorporated most of the el- 
ements of the Schengen agreements and 
addednew elements. Most recently, the 
effort to ratlfy and implement the terms 
of the Treaty of Amsterdam signed in 
1997, promises for more E.U. institu- 
tional control over refugee policy. 
To many refugees, Europe was erect- 
ing legal walls around itself. The E.U. 
countries served notice that they would 
invoke the first asylum principle and 
the safe country of origin doctrine not 
only to exclude claimants, but also to 
exclude applicants even before their 
petitions were resolved.16 The trend 
has also been to permit expedited deter- 
mination procedures with fewer legal 
protections for asylum seekers and 
greater discretion for officials. The 
working party on asylum procedures of 
the International Association of Refu- 
gee Law Judges has examined the use of 
such procedures and found that while 
they may have the benefit of speed and 
efficiency, they pose serious risks that 
the rights of asylum seekers will be sac- 
rificed in the bargain.17 
The U.S. case also demonstrated simi- 
lar trends. Although the United States 
was a major supporter of the 1951 Con- 
vention and the 1967Protoco1, it did not 
formally join these agreements until 
1968 and did not adopt a comprehen- 
sive Refugee Act until 1980.18 Part of the 
original impetus for passage of the 1980 
legislation came from the sad history of 
U.S. behaviour in Southeast Asia and 
the problems that emerged in dealing 
with refugees following the American 
pull-out.19 
But before the ink was dry on the new 
law, theU.S. was moving torestrict entry 
and discriminating among applicant 
groups on political and according to 
many critics, racial grounds. Tensions 
grew over the handling of Cuban and 
Haitian asylum seekers that were ulti- 
mately addressed not through legisla- 
tion, but by the executive orders issued 
by Presidents Reagan, Bush and 
C l i n t ~ n . ~ ~  The U.S. government ulti- 
mately entered into a consent decree in 
the case of American Baptist Churches v. 
Thornburgh?' effectively admitting dis- 
crimination in Central American asy- 
lum cases and agreeing to reconsider 
virtually all Salvadoran and Guatema- 
lan asylum applicants during the pe- 
riod. In 1996, anew immigration statute 
was adopted that granted much greater 
discretion to Immigration and Naturali- 
zation Service officers. It provided for 
expedited summary asylum deter- 
minations at the border with little or no 
judicial review 22 EventheU.S. Justice 
Department declined to implement 
some of the more extreme provisions of 
the statute and to provide more protec- 
tions than were required.23 At this 
point, the best that can be said is that the 
U.S. had gone back to the ad hoc ap- 
proach to refugees that existed decades 
ago. Not surprisingly, the laws and 
practices adopted by the European na- 
tions and the U.S. have sent signals that 
the doors are closed in these locations, 
thus making Canada an even more at- 
tractive destination than ever before. 
However, Canada has moved in the 
same direction as its American and 
Europeanallies. The contemporary line 
of policy development can be traced 
back to the late 1980s when Immigration 
Minister Barbara McDougall an- 
nounced a major move to tighten the 
system, including efforts to speedup the 
status determination process and clear 
a large backlog of pending cases. It was 
this round of policymaking that pro- 
duced C-55 in 1989 and resulted in the 
creation of the Immigration and Refugee 
Board (IRB). Then came C-86 in 1992 
which further trimmed the hearing 
process and constrained appeals. 
These measures were intended not only 
to streamlinebut also to restrict refugee 
admissions and the percentage of ap- 
provals did fall, according to the then 
IRB General CounselGerald Stobo, from 
76% in 1989 to 48% by late 1993." Citi- 
zenship and Immigration Canada was 
created in 1994 and efforts have been 
made since then to reevaluate and re- 
place the existing citizenship law. 
- 
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Minister Lucienne Robillard ap- 
pointed a Legislative Review Advisory 
Group inNovember of 1996 to review the 
existing Immigration Act. Its January 
1998 report, entitled Not Just Numbers: A 
Canadian Framework for Future Immigra- 
tionIz5 included 172 recommendations. 
After a year of consultation and planning, 
CIC issued its white paper Building on a 
Strong Foundation for the21st Centu y: Di- 
rections for Immigration and Refugee Policy 
and Legislati~n.~~ Several things were 
clear. First, the government had heard 
complaints about the need to reduce de- 
lays in the refugee status determination 
process, calls regarding the need for 
greater attention to family reunification 
and demands that provisions be enacted 
that would permit CIC to respond toemer- 
gency situations abroad that called for 
rapid removal to Canada of threatened 
persons. At the same time, there is no 
doubt that enforcement had become the 
central feature of the new policymaking 
efforts. Whatever themotive forces, as the 
white paper pointed out: "No compre- 
hensive review of the legislation has been 
undertaken during the past two decades. 
The Act has been amended, on an ad hoc 
basis, more than 30 times, resulting in a 
complex patchwork of legislative provi- 
sions that lack coherence and transpar- 
ency. The logic and key principles of the 
Act have become difficult to discern for 
both immigrants and Canadian~."~~ In- 
deed, the government eventually tabled a 
comprehensive legislative proposal to re- 
write the Citizenship Act in November 
1999 known as C-16 that embodied the 
concerns noted above. 
It became clear from the report and in 
the proposed legislation that enforce- 
ment and the emphasis on exclusion of 
unworthy claimants are dominant 
themes. Thus, for example, while the 
chapter of the white paper entitled "Refu- 
gee Protection" presents two issues that 
are associated with added protections for 
refugees, the other six highlighted issues 
that had to do with enforcement and ex- 
clusion of unqualified  applicant^.^^ The 
other chapters reveal a similar emphasis, 
as do theMinisterrs speeches throughout 
the fall of 1999 and into the beginning of 
2000.29 Her speeches emphasize that the 
government's approach can be summa- 
rized in three words: Faster, but fair. 
Or as Peter Showler, the current Immi- 
gration and Refugee Board Chair, has 
put it: Fair,but faster.30 Onemight sug- 
gest that the order of the words matters 
more than a little. From the perspec- 
tive of the refugee claimant, it is f i e  to 
reduce the waiting time for decisions 
and to speed up family reunification. 
On the other hand, moves such as in- 
creasing pressure for greater identity 
documentation at entry, expanding 
the use of detention, speeding up the 
hearing and decision process, stream- 
lining review processes, and tighten- 
ing judicial review suggest that the 
"faster" is likely to prevail over the 
"fair.', That was, as noted above, pre- 
cisely what the International Associa- 
tion of Refugee Law Judges concluded 
has been happening based upon an 
examination of the expedited proce- 
duresnow in use in anumber of coun- 
tries. The new provisions of the 
Citizenship Act proposed as C-16not 
only move to implement some of these 
streamlining suggestions, but also 
grant new authority to revoke citizen- 
ship (Sec. 16), block citizenship on 
broad assertions of public interest 
(Sec. 21) or national security interest 
(Sec. 23) by the Minister. It also ex- 
pands the list of those ineligible to 
apply for citizenship (Sec. 28). Since 
this was written the new refugee law 
C-31 has been tabled as well. 
It must be said that even with all 
these steps, Canada has not moved 
nearly as dramatically to block or chal- 
lenge asylum seekers as theU.S. or the 
E.U. Even so, there can be little doubt 
about the general direction of the ef- 
forts to change the law and the process 
by which it is administered in an en- 
forcement mode with the emphasis on 
protecting the nation against criminal 
smuggling of persons, detecting and 
rapidly excluding illegitimate at- 
tempts to claim refugee status and 
building the legal capacity to appre- 
hend and remove anyone perceived to 
have made it through the process but 
who later is determined to have been 
undesirable. 
At a minimum, these processes in 
Canada, the U.S. and Europe, place a 
premium on the ability of newly arrived 
refugee claimants to be fully ready to 
make their legal claim, assume knowl- 
edge of the requirements for doing so 
and in truth demand rapid access to 
legal assistance. However, these expec- 
tations come at a time when legal aid 
has been limited. Moreover, with in- 
creasingly stringent requirements to 
qualify for services in some provinces, 
service providers require greater legal 
counselling in order to assist their cli- 
ents. 
The Move to Service Networks 
From Multiple Loosely Coupled 
Organizations: A Transformation 
More Real Than Apparent 
These legal, financial, and political 
changes have all had significant effects 
not only on refugees and refugee claim- 
ants but also on the organizations that 
seek to serve them. One of the results of 
these increasingly challenging features 
of the refugee service environment has 
been an increasing pressure, often un- 
spoken, to alter the structure and char- 
acter of refugee service delivery from a 
relatively loosely coupled collection of 
largely independent organizations to- 
ward ahighly stressed servicenetwork. 
It is therefore extremely important to 
consider the general trend in human 
services toward the service network 
model, the realities of networkmanage- 
ment and the implications of life in a 
highly stressed service network for refu- 
gee services. 
For some time, NGOs were created 
and evolved relatively independently. 
Many grew from small groups that came 
together, often with some or most of their 
members as volunteers. Others devel- 
oped from church or civil groups that 
decided to develop a project group to 
sponsor or work with refugees. Still, 
others emerged from refugee and immi- 
grant communities themselves as those 
who had been in Canada long enough to 
feel settled themselves tried to help oth- 
ers who were facing the same daunting 
experience. 
These groups became important 
parts of a service system made up of 
loosely coupled organizations, many of 
which focused onvery different kinds of 
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clients, needs and services. Many of the 
programmes they provided developed 
because of needs recognized in the 
schools, by medical practitioners, po- 
lice agencies, child welfare officials, or 
employment and economic develop- 
ment stakeholders. Their missions var- 
ied dramatically and their funding and 
organization were equally diverse. In 
some cases, they formed relatively sim- 
ple partnerships with these agencies, 
involving pilot programmes or modest 
service agreements. 
However, as service demands in- 
creased and resources declined, pres- 
sures grew not only concerning how to 
meet new levels of service demand but 
also about survival itself. Pressures 
grew to compete more vigorously for 
grants and contracts. However, that 
often meant making one's organization 
look more and more like what the re- 
quests for proposals seek. As groups 
scrambled to look more like the fewer 
funding sources desired, it appeared as 
though there was more redundancy, a 
justification for further reductions. 
Given the fact that much of the soft 
money had relatively brief funding cy- 
cles, the scrambling became less of a 
sporadic activity than an ongoing chal- 
lenge. It also meant that organizations 
had to consider more carefully what 
they could and couldnot deliver. From 
the government perspective, there has 
been greater pressure to eliminate re- 
dundancy, enhance efficiency and en- 
sure greater accountability. Given these 
conditions, pressures and expecta- 
tions, the tendency has been to move, 
deliberately or de facto, toward a net- 
work model of service delivery with a 
variety of sigruficant consequences for 
all concerned. 
The Critical Realities of Network 
Management 
There was a time when citizens often 
looked to Governments to provide serv- 
ices directly. However, the range of serv- 
ice demands, constraints on the size of 
ministries and agencies and a desire for 
a variety of approaches to service deliv- 
ery led to a growing tendency of govem- 
ments to form relationships, often 
termed public/private partnerships, to 
support the missions of the various 
NGOs and local government agencies 
that actually delivered the services. StiU, 
the relationships were often relatively 
loose and informal, in part at least to 
allow room for thenot-for-profits to use 
their creativity and special knowledge 
without undue bureaucratic baggage 
from government. If there was a service 
gap, these organizations were often able 
to locate resources, modest though they 
may have been, to pickup the slack. And, 
since the NGO workers and volunteers 
were so often very committed people, 
they dig deep to find innovative solu- 
tions to the service issues innew ways to 
build trust, better communications with 
local agencies like police, school princi- 
pals, or health care providers and more 
effective mechanisms for eliciting in- 
volvement by parents and others in the 
immigrant communities who have so 
much to offer. Indeed, it was in this way 
that some groups began to expand their 
operations and build their organiza- 
tions. NGOs sought toremain relatively 
informal and loosely coupled both in 
terms of their internal operations and 
their relationships to other service pro- 
viders. Management was often not re- 
garded as particularly important, for 
decision making processes remaining, 
to one degree or another, essentially col- 
laborative. 
As financial, political, legal demands 
and pressures mounted, the need for all 
attention to management has grown. 
Service organizations have found them- 
selves competing for available grants 
and contracts. Unfortunately, eachnew 
funding arrangement has brought new 
obligations that have added more 
stress. The irony was that at the same 
time that service providers saw them- 
selves in one way or another as competi- 
tors, they were also becoming more and 
more interdependent and governments 
were becoming more interdependent 
with these service providers as welI3l 
Government could not provide directly 
the required services. Few NGOs pos- 
sessed the slack resources to fill in gaps 
if other service providers failed or termi- 
nated programmes. No longer could 
governments, federal or provincial, 
think in terms of simple partnerships, a 
concept that conjures up apicture of two 
parties deciding to cooperate for a dis- 
crete purpose. Refugee services had 
become a network and given the in- 
creasing interdependencies among the 
participants, it could not be considered 
loosely coupled. 
What is a Service Network and Why 
Does It Matter? 
There is more involved in the rise of serv- 
ice networks than accidents of political 
and economic history. Popularized by 
international corporate operations, the 
idea of network operations has been to 
achieve maximum efficiency and mini- 
mum capitalization requirements by 
creatingnetworks to produce and mar- 
ket a product or service rather than cre- 
ating a single organization to do the job. 
It is also referred to in some settings as 
the concept of the "hollow corpora- 
t i ~ n " ~ ~  or in a more recent manifesta- 
tion "the virtual c~rporation.'"~ 
One of the earlier and most com- 
monly cited examples is Nike, the ath- 
letic shoe company.34 The idea is that a 
company contracts with a firm in one 
country tomake the shoes, with another 
to handle distribution, another to do 
marketing, and others to provide other 
necessary services. In such a network, 
one must manage not only each of the 
organizations in the network, some- 
times referred to as nodes, but also the 
linkages among thenodes as well. If any 
unit in the network breaks down or if 
any of the relationships among units is 
blocked or fails, then the networkman- 
ager must find a way to fill the gap and 
repair the system. Thus, the network is 
based on mutual interdependencies. 
The issue is not just the needs of the firm 
whose logo goes on the product, but the 
interests of all of the other participants 
in the process as well. The shoe manu- 
facturer is dependent not only on the 
corporation that purchased the shoes 
for its product line, but the distributors, 
marketers, and others without whose 
contribution the buyer will fail and be 
unable to pay for the product or buy 
more. Hence the maintenance of the 
critical linkages among the units as well 
as the skills that the managers have 
within each of the units are essential to 
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the success of the entire network and all 
of those who participate in it. 
The advantages of networks seemed 
to be that they allow the organization 
that seeks a network operation two im- 
portant options. First and most impor- 
tant for many firms, is that this mode of 
operation allows the networkbuilder to 
shed costs, both operational and capi- 
tal. The network is built with a series of 
contracts with each of the other units in 
the network. Each contractor is respon- 
sible for its own plant and equipment. 
More than that, it is responsible for the 
recruitment, training, management and 
compensation of its people. Indeed, 
even where a firm had capabilities in- 
house, executives often chose to spin 
those units off into separate businesses 
to shed costs and manage responsibili- 
ties. Taken far enough, this allows an 
organization to trim its costs to themini- 
mum by slimming down internally to 
perform only those functions that could 
not be contracted out. Hence the firm 
was enhancing its own productivity 
and efficiency by retaining and consurn- 
ing only those resources absolutely nec- 
essary to its operation. The efficiencies 
for the other units in the system are 
achieved by using the marketplace to 
control contractor costs. This of course 
assumes the existence of a competitive 
market in whatever goods or services 
required. 
The second advantagecitedby advo- 
cates for network operations is flexibil- 
ity. At its best, the network relies upon 
all its units to use their creativity to ad- 
dress problems as they arise, as opposed 
to an integrated organization that must 
find solutions for all problems that come 
through the doors. If the contractors are 
unable to meet the new challenges, then 
one could simply drop that contractor 
and enter into an agreement with anew 
one. Supply and demand would pre- 
sumably generate new potential con- 
tractors with the necessary capabilities 
and with employees possessing the 
needed skill sets to deal with the chang- 
ing environment. 
The public sector counterpart of these 
developmentsis what has been referred 
to as the "Hollow Government" pushed 
by politicians around the world bent on 
cutting the size of government minis- 
tries and budgets, privatizing to the 
greatest degree possible and employing 
as many private sector management 
tools as possible.35 And these moves 
were supported by advocates of what 
has been termed the New Public 
Management.36 Although contracting 
out for goods and services was an im- 
portant part of governance for many 
years, it dramatically expanded during 
the 1980s and 1990s to the point where 
governments have become dependent 
upon not-for-profit and for-profit or- 
ganizations to deliver most of its serv- 
ices and in which governments no 
longer have the capability of delivering 
any significant portion of many of the 
services it is mandated to make 
available.37 The hope was that these 
public service networks would bring the 
same kinds of benefits as their private 
sector counterparts. 
Caution! Network Management Is 
Diferent 
However, some of the early advocates 
for network operations failed to recog- 
nize some of the challenges that such an 
approach entailed. Even those in the 
private sector found that the model 
posed "real risks," including the loss of 
control, dependence upon other organi- 
zations that might "drop the ball," the 
danger that a firm could become in- 
volved with organizations that could 
tarnish its reputation, theneed to share 
sensitive information and themore com- 
plex the entanglements of the network, 
the more likely it is that participating 
units might "stumble."38 Above all, the 
networkmode of operationmeant "new 
challenges for management."39 
If the operation of tight networks 
posed difficulties for private sector 
groups, it meant even more complicated 
challenges for public service organiza- 
tions. Looking back on early experi- 
ences with network efforts, Agranoff 
and McGuire concluded: 
One realization is becoming increas- 
ingly clear: the capacities required to 
operate successfully in network set- 
tings are different from the capabili- 
ties needed to succeed at managing a 
single organization. The classical, 
mostly intra-organizational inspired 
management perspective that has 
guided public administration for 
more than a century is simply inap- 
plicable for multi-organizational, 
multi-governmental, and multi- 
sectoral forms of governing.40 
And they added that "there are many 
more questions than answers in net- 
work~nanagement."~~ Inaddition to the 
planning, organizing, staffing, budget- 
ing and other traditional functions 
within their own organizations, man- 
agers innetworksmust alsobe engaged 
in such specialized activities as "activa- 
tion,", "framing," "mobilizing," and 
"synthesizing."" At a minimum, it is 
essential to recognize the level of sophis- 
tication and capabilities necessary to 
networkmanagement. However, many 
of the organizations involved in net- 
works donot even have really effective 
contract management capabilities, let 
alone the more sophisticated require- 
ments of networkmanagement. Build- 
ing that kind of capability not only 
means assigning people now attending 
to direct service or direct supervision to 
new tasks,but requires the development 
of new skills or the hiring of people with 
the kinds of specialized knowledge 
necessary to meet the evolving chal- 
lenges posed by network operations. 
There are other challenges that are 
more complex for the public sector net- 
works as well. Since the programmes 
involved are sometimes mandated serv- 
ices for needy clients, network failures 
mean that someone must be able to step 
in rapidly. Where government does not 
have the capability to do that, it must be 
able to find alternate providers, which 
is not always easy. For one thing, there 
may be important controls to be satis- 
fied concerning access to and use of 
confidential client information, particu- 
larly where children or health care is- 
sues are involved as is common in 
refugee services. 
Of course, the ability to take advan- 
tage of the claimed flexibility of net- 
works requires that there be multiple 
suppliers available. However, as net- 
worksbecome tighter andmore interde- 
pendent (some might say more efficient) 
there are often relative few alternates 
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available. This is one of the reasons that 
those who have studied the matter have 
found that networks work best in re- 
source rich environments, not the other 
way around.43 Resource poor environ- 
ments can increase competition among 
some network participants which, in 
turn, can undermine the levels of trust 
that are so essential to the effective op- 
erationof thenetwork. Unfortunately,it 
has generally been the case in Canada 
in recent years that public service net- 
works are anything but resource rich. 
Clearly, networks in the public serv- 
ice arena, particularly in the world of 
refugee services, are very different from 
for-profit private sector networks. For 
one thing, they must respond to values 
other than economic efficiency and their 
success cannot be measured by profits. 
In addition to efficiency, public sector 
operations must meet obligations of 
economy, effectiveness, equity, respon- 
siveness and responsibility. 
Moreover, the people who provide 
the human resources that are at the very 
core of refugee service delivery are in a 
very different situation from private sec- 
tor employees. Many refugee service 
organizations depend upon volunteer 
programmes to provide important ele- 
ments of their programmes and also as 
a recruitment device for future employ- 
ees. Development and operation of 
such volunteer programmes requires 
signtfrcant investment of time and en- 
ergy because volunteer work is a con- 
cept that is not well known in many 
other countries. Employees may be 
paid, but they are oftenexpected to pro- 
vide far more hours and effort than a 
similar employee in a private firm. They 
are expected to do multiple duty inboth 
direct service delivery and also in or- 
ganizational maintenance and sup- 
port. Moreover, they are expected to 
devote a sigxuficant amount of time and 
effort to participation in community 
programmes and projects within the 
immigrant and refugee communities 
they serve. All of these challenges shape 
the notion of leadership and manage- 
ment of the refugee service agencies, the 
other agencies, local governments and 
ministries that depend upon them, com- 
plex and challenging. 
Leaders are stressed to spend more 
time on boundary spanning and fund- 
raising at a time when the stresses 
within their organizations require more 
hands-on effort. If those within the or- 
ganization or their board of directors 
feel that management and leadership 
are no longer attentive to concerns at the 
point of service and within their organi- 
zation, that situation can fuel tension 
and evenconflict within these NGOS.~ 
These are only some of the reasons 
why public service networks are more 
complex than their private sector ana- 
logs. With these differences inmind, let 
us turn to some of the more specific im- 
plications of increasing pressure to 
move into tightly interdependent serv- 
ice networks in the area of refugee serv- 
ices. 
The Implications of Networks for 
Refugee Services 
There are anumber of implications that 
flow from the trends discussed thus far. 
The discussion of network issues to this 
point or the more pointed observations 
to follow arenot intended to say that the 
idea of networks should be abandoned 
or that efforts should not be made to 
ensure that refugee service systems 
should be less than efficient. After all, 
there are increasing demands and de- 
creasing resources to provide critically 
important services. And it is unlikely 
that we willmovebackward to a time of 
relatively autonomous organizations 
operating in loosely coupled partner- 
ships. It is, however, necessary that we 
come to grips with what is required to 
lead and operate service networks. It is 
also important not to push the network 
model too far in ways that donot recog- 
nize the differencesbetween the private, 
for-profit model and the realities of refu- 
gee service delivery in the public arena 
that is not about profit that is not solely 
concerned with efficiency. 
The following preliminary observa- 
tions about refugee service networks are 
not meant tobeexhaustive. Rather, they 
are intended to indicate why it is impor- 
tant for all those who participate inrefu- 
gee services to think further about the 
realities of life in the network. These 
illustrative issues include the impor- 
tance of networks by design and not 
accident, the importance of capacity 
building for all participants, the chal- 
lenges of governance of the network, the 
need to address resources in the net- 
work, the criticalimportance of account- 
ability and the internal impacts onNGO 
service providers in the network. 
Networks as Deliberate Choices 
If government wants to have refugee 
services provided by anetwork instead 
of a group of loosely coupled NGOpart- 
ners, that decision is best made forth- 
rightly and should not be the result of 
uncontrolled policy drift. On the one 
hand, such networks cannot work well 
if the approach to their management is 
merely to seek to turn NGOs into stand- 
ard units of ministries. The strength of 
- 
refugee service organizations in 
Canada is that they are very different in 
nature, function and operation. On the 
other hand, the structure of networks 
and the processes by which they func- 
t i~nmat ter .~~ At some point, it becomes 
important for all of the participants in 
the service networks to understand 
what the networks are, who is in the 
network, how it is structured and what 
formal or informal understandings 
guide the operation of the network. 
In some instances, of course, the net- 
works are relatively formal and are es- 
tablished in part at least by legislation, 
regulations, grants, or contracts. In 
other instances, they are much more 
informal. For example, while police 
departments are oftennot formally part 
of a network that centres on school 
based programmes, law enforcement 
agencies can often be helpful to or prob- 
lematic for the refugee community in a 
variety of ways. The object of attempting 
tobe clear inunderstanding networks is 
not to formalize them to the point where 
they lose their flexibility, but to ensure 
that it is clear that there is a network and 
to be clear how it works, or for that mat- 
ter does not work. 
Of course, if the networks are to be 
understood and their operation sup- 
ported, the focus of effort must be clear. 
It is unlikely that the network chal- 
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lenges can be met and the basic goals of 
refugee services can be achieved if the 
focus on decision making is shifted pri- 
marily to law enforcement concerns 
such as efforts to block immigrant smug- 
gling or illegal refugee claims. If the 
refugee networks become confused 
about the primary purpose, and focus 
only on stamping out ailments in the 
sys tem, they may succeed in curing the 
disease only to have killed or seriously 
weakened the patient, thelarger society 
that has benefited so much from the 
strength, intelligence, and creativity 
contributed by refugees and other new 
arrivals. 
Capacity Building: An Essential 
Element for Ensuring Efective 
Service Network Operations 
If the object is to create and rely upon a 
network to provide public services, then 
it is essential to consciously determine 
who will provide the resources for net- 
work maintenance and the manage- 
ment capabilities to ensure its 
effectiveness. It is in everyone's best 
interest to ensure that all of the units 
participating in the network have the 
requisite capabilities. In relatively 
tightly linked networks with high levels 
of interdependency, the entirenetwork 
is only as strong as its weakest compo- 
nent. 
In particular, there are several factors 
that require attention in capacitybuild- 
ing for networkoperations. First, public 
service networkmanagement requires a 
fairly high degree of sophistication. In 
the first place, the backbone of most 
networks is a set of contracts or grants in 
the nature of contracts. Few organiza- 
tions will claim that they have substan- 
tial contract management capabilities. 
Beyond that, while each participant in 
thenetworkmust manage its own inter- 
nal operations, each must also partici- 
pate in the management of the network 
and networks are subject to a host of 
uncertainties and c~ntingencies.~~ 
The resources tobuild the capacity to 
function in networks must come from 
somewhere. While associations of pro- 
vider organizations can support some 
of the work, it is clear that governments 
must accept responsibility for a signifi- 
cant part of the capacity building effort. 
Just as the government must provide 
resources for networkmanagement, so 
do ministries, both federal and provin- 
cial must be provided with the types and 
amounts of resources needed to perform 
their roles. It is not possible to push 
more demands and large amounts of 
resources through ministries that have 
been cut to the point where they no 
longer have the capacity to perform their 
base functions, let alone new obliga- 
tions. The first casualty of that kind of 
behaviour is decreasing support from 
those ministries to the NGOs for the 
delivery of services. The second willbe 
loss of accountability. 
Governance is a Critical Fact of 
Life: Whether It is Recognized 
as Such or Not 
Attention must also be paid to the gov- 
ernance of such networks. As Milward 
puts it: 
The fact that a hollow state relies on 
networks is a weakness as well as a 
strength. . . Networks, the mainstay 
of the hollow state, are inherently 
weaker forms of social action. Be- 
cause of the need to coordinate joint 
production, networks are inherently 
unstable over time. Managers con- 
tinually are faced with problems that 
can lead to instability negotiating, 
coordinating, monitoring, holding 
third parties accountable and writing 
and enforcing contracts . . P7 
Networks donot respond we11 to sim- 
ple overhead controls. Besides, the crea- 
tivity and drive that make NGOs such 
constructive partners for the provision 
of public services can easily be lost if 
they are not afforded an active role in the 
governance of the network. 
All this having been said, there are 
power relationships among the units of 
anetwork and not simply from govern- 
ment to NGOs. Those who have studied 
the matter find that governance issues 
relating to power are often overlooked 
because it is assumed that the very idea 
of networks implies mutual coopera- 
tion and the assumption that special 
interests are to be "checked at the 
door."48 However, anyone who has par- 
ticipated in meetings involving 
schools, refugee service agencies, pro- 
vincial authorities and city officials 
. 
knows that the representatives of each 
of these organizations come to the meet- 
ing with a sense of his or her specific 
mission and of the interests of the or- 
ganization each represents in addition 
to their common concern for theneeds of 
refugees. 
While the lessons of the private sector 
networks may be of some assistance, 
such issues as accountability and the 
critical importance of high levels of trust 
between clients and service providers 
make the refugee service context very 
different. Among other reasons, the 
kinds of incentive systems that are often 
used to manage private operations are 
very different from the public setting. 
For all these reasons, it is important to 
consider how the networks in which 
one operates is governed. That means 
not only a consideration of cooperative 
efforts, but also a willingness to con- 
sider what happens when conflicts 
arise. It also requires thought about the 
kinds of issues that each of the partici- 
pants in the refugee service network 
brings to the table. 
The Nagging Problem of Resource 
Scarcity and Interdependence 
One of the serious problems facing refu- 
gee service networks is the difficulty of 
resource shortages amidst increasing 
demands for services. The kinds of cuts 
in federal funding, in transfer payments 
to the provinces and reductions in sup- 
port at the provincial level for local serv- 
ice providers and local units of 
government have presented precisely 
the kinds of circumstances, that those 
who study networks suggest, are coun- 
terproductive. They are counterproduc- 
tive in part because they provide 
incentives for NGOs to compete with 
one another for resources in the form of 
more limited number of grants and con- 
tracts. Moreover, where the funds for 
existing grants or contracts are reduced, 
providers are faced with a need to seek 
a larger number of grants or contracts to 
yield the same level of funding, which is 
essential if those organizations are to be 
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able to support their paid staff and their 
operations. Of course, each of those 
grants or contracts comes with adminis- 
trative costs and reporting obligations 
as well as the need to perform the spe- 
cific activities set forth in the funding 
agreement. Thus, the NGO is leveraged 
to produce more for the same amount of 
funding or less. Not only that, but the 
organizationmust find a way to release 
officers to do the additional workon the 
funding applications as well as admin- 
istration of the additional programmes 
if the applications are successful. 
There is the additional problem that 
the issue of resources in a network con- 
text is not simply a question of the re- 
sources available to a particular service 
provider organization. It also has to do 
with the cumulative resources available 
to the network. Thus, the dramatic re- 
ductions in funds from the provincial 
level in British Columbia to municipali- 
ties primarily affects police and fire 
agencies. That,in turn,means that there 
are fewer training dollars and less time 
available for programmes that refugee 
groups would like to operate with those 
emergency services units. Similarly, the 
issue of resources in Ontario includes 
educational funding cuts, changes in 
English as a Second Language (ESL) 
programme eligibility that in effect are 
programme cuts and the crisis in the 
health care programmes, as well as re- 
strictions on access to certain kinds of 
benefit programmes for applicants at 
certain stages of the refugee claimant 
process. All of these funding issues af- 
fect, for example, multicultural liaison 
officers based in the schools. 
The ironic fact is that a reduction in 
available services can intensify the pres- 
sures within refugee families and ulti- 
mately produce greater demand if the 
family moves into crisis or if the chil- 
dren begin to manifest behavioural dif- 
ficulties in school or even find 
themselves in trouble with law enforce- 
ment authorities. It is important to con- 
sider not only the resource base of a 
particular unit of anetwork, but also the 
general resource picture of the network 
relative to its responsibilities and the 
population it is expected to serve. An- 
other irony arises from the fact that re- 
source needs are increased when an en- 
forcement oriented emphasis is under- 
taken, since it requires more application 
materials and more record keeping to 
ensure that applicants are truly quali- 
fied to receive the services and to protect 
against misuse of the system. Hence, the 
costs of service delivery in the network 
increase for the same level of services. 
Of course, one of these network-wide 
resource issues has to do with the prob- 
lem of network management. For rea- 
sons noted earlier, successful network 
operations require capacity building. 
That capacity must include the where- 
withal to conduct network governance, 
to carry out essential coordination and 
buffering among network units. Then 
there is the need for the capacity in the 
network to handle accountability con- 
cerns which become increasingly com- 
plex in network operations. 
The Accountability Challenge 
Virtually everyone who has studiednet- 
works agrees that accountability in 
such settings is particularly difficult. 
There are severalreasons. For one thing, 
it has been argued that "The leakage of 
accountability in the hollow state and 
the lack of government capability or 
willingness to effectively manage its 
contracts with nonprofits is a major 
problem."49 This issue of "leakage" is 
a concept popularized by Bardach and 
Lesser who argue that the fact the "leak- 
age of authority" that occurs whennet- 
works are created and operated 
collaboratively offers flexibility, but it 
also makes accountability much more 
complex.50 Because authority and re- 
sponsibility are parcelled out within 
the network, it is difficult to get a clear 
picture of how well the network is per- 
forming as well as the effectiveness of 
individual units within the network. 
The NGOs within the network are ac- 
countable not to only the governments 
and private funding agencies at all lev- 
els who provide resources, but also to 
their boards of directors, to the other 
member units of the network and ulti- 
mately to the refugees and their families 
for whom the entire system was created 
in the first place. The ministries, in turn, 
face other accountability requirements 
for the operation of the network, as the 
recent debates over the operation of Hu- 
man Resources Development Canada 
indicate. 
With regard to ministries, one of the 
problems is that the nature of discus- 
sions of accountability within the con- 
text of the New Public Management 
have become more complex generally, 
quite apart from the additional issues 
presented by service delivery networks. 
It is clear that while ministerial respon- 
sibility is avery positive concept that is 
central to Canadian democracy, there 
seem to have been changes in the way 
that this traditional mechanism of ac- 
countability operates in the contempo- 
raryenvir~nrnent.~~ Beyond that there 
has been an increasing tendency in 
Canada to employ legal tools of ac- 
countability. It is ironic that during the 
very period when Canadians were in- 
creasingly using the courts to test gov- 
ernment policy and behaviour, efforts 
havebeenmade to restrict access by refu- 
gee claimants and other new arrivals to 
call upon the courts for substantive ju- 
dicial review. In the midst of this set of 
dynamics, administrative reform efforts 
called for market oriented tools of ac- 
countability to be employed, such as 
outcome measures, customer satisfac- 
tion assessments and broad perform- 
ance management techniques. How- 
ever, there is a good deal to be done to 
consider how these various devices 
apply to public service networks. 
Internal Impacts on Refugee Service 
Organizations 
All of these factors add up to produce a 
variety of impacts within individual 
refugee service organizations. The facts 
of life in service networks add stresses 
as executives spend more time on 
boundary spanning obligations and 
funding issues which takes them away 
from the organization's primary mis- 
sion, straining relationships with work- 
ers and sometimes with boards of 
directors.52 It is often the case that net- 
works expect that member organiza- 
tions will, as one private sector network 
advocate recommends, "offer the best 
and brightest. Put your best people into 
these  relationship^."^^ However, do- 
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ing so frequently brings stress inside the 
home organization. 
Even more than that, however, is the 
importance of the presence of leverage 
pressures in the networks. The fact is 
that the use of grants and contracts with 
not-for-profit is viewed in part at least as 
a way of leveraging greater impact from 
the same dollars than what could be 
developed in a government organiza- 
tion and competition for resources 
makes it possible to leverage more.54 
That additional impact must come from 
the organization and its people. And 
because refugee service workers are so 
committed to their mission, they often 
willingly accept obligations to attend 
evening meetings, invitations to week- 
end events in the refugee and immigrant 
communities and emergency requests 
for help at virtually any time. However, 
there are costs to the service providers 
and their families for this commitment 
and responsiveness. 
Unfortunately, however, there is of- 
ten a tendency to underestimate these 
and other real costs relative to actual 
revenue that comes into a service organi- 
zation from grants and contracts in ad- 
dition to the costs mentioned earlier 
having to do with the actual prepara- 
tion of proposals and administration of 
grants or contracts. Failing to incorpo- 
rate the investments of time and energy 
required for grant writing and contract 
administration in assessments of re- 
source commitment for service delivery 
is a serious miscalculation of true cost. 
Similarly, assuming contributions from 
other units of the network that may not 
in realitybe able to continue support at 
current levels let alone to enhance is a 
further problem. These errors maypro- 
duce overestimated resources and un- 
derestimated obligations. And just as 
ministries and local government agen- 
cies cannot contribute funds that they 
donot have, NGOs cannot provide serv- 
ice commitments that they cannot sup- 
port without damaging their people and 
their organizations. These extraordi- 
nary efforts can be mounted during 
emergencies or for relatively limited 
periods, but if they continue for too long, 
they will take a toll. 
Even assuming that a network par- 
ticipant is not overextended, it is still 
important that the people within the 
organization be equipped by training 
and support to deal with the stresses 
that the network is producing. For ex- 
ample, as programme eligibility rules 
become more stringent, it is important 
that personnel be trained to meet those 
new situations in order to better serve 
refugee clients. It is particularly helpful 
if people from other parts of the network, 
including government units, can be 
trained together. Unfortunately, in or- 
ganizations, both governmental and 
nongovernmental, that are under finan- 
cial stress, training and professional 
development is often one of the first ar- 
eas to be cut if indeed such support was 
ever available. Moreover, apart from 
training programmes, few organiza- 
tions in the network provide organiza- 
tional renewal support. It should be no 
surprise to find that burnout is a prob- 
lem even among committed service pro- 
viders. That accumulated stress can 
manifest in increased conflict within or- 
ganizations as well as in more personal 
ways. 
Of course, one of the dangers that can 
come fromnetwork stresses is a sense by 
service workers of a loss of identity. In 
the refugee service arena, many workers 
came to particular organizations be- 
cause of a strong commitment to what 
the agency does. If the organization al- 
ters its directions or seeks to change its 
mission and character because of the 
demands of networks, there is a danger 
of internal conflict. The same is true if a 
board of trustees, believing that it 
should focus primarily on the demands 
of the network, hires executives who are, 
or who are perceived tobe, more commit- 
ted to the network than they are to their 
own organization and the people it was 
designed to serve. If the executive de- 
cides to focus primary attention on en- 
trepreneurial efforts to entertain new 
programmes as opportunities for the or- 
ganization, the messagemaybe that the 
existingprogramrnes arenot important. 
That canbe devastating to paid employ- 
ees or volunteers who have worked long 
and hard to develop the ongoing pro- 
grammes and make them work in the 
face of challenges. These kinds of 
changes are particularly difficult in 
refugee services where successful per- 
formance dependsupon trust that takes 
years to build in the refugee and immi- 
grant communities. Success also de- 
pends upon a sense of continuity and 
continuing service even though it is 
clear that the network context and the 
larger environment within which serv- 
ice networks function is turbulent. 
Conclusion 
To those who work in the schools, clin- 
ics, settlement offices, or legal settings, 
it may sometimes appear that they oper- 
ate almost alone. For those who workin 
local NGOs providing particular types 
of services, it can appear that they are 
struggling to create and deliver services 
out of what is available locally to meet 
a great need with little assistance. From 
the perspective of government officials 
at the provincial level or in Ottawa, the 
challenge is to address some 25,000 
new refugee arrivals each year and to 
provide some level of support for the 
service systems on which those new 
Canadians must depend for their settle- 
ment and integration into society. But 
the reality is that all of these people are 
participants in refugee service net- 
works. And what each can or cannot 
accomplish on behalf of refugees is in 
very important respects related to how 
those service networks function. 
Certainly the networks are affected 
by the political, economic and legal 
pressures in their environment. There 
is little question that political pressures 
to constrain grants of asylum and to 
take an approach that is heavily ori- 
ented toward enforcement complicates 
the tasks of both the refugees and the 
service providers who seek to assist 
them. The set of economic cutbacks at 
all levels and across the full range of 
agencies and services has placed a se- 
vere strain on those providers as well. 
And certainly, the possibility of signifi- 
cantly more complex and restrictive 
policies at the federal and provincial 
levels in a variety of social service pro- 
grammes adds to the pressure on the 
organizations within the service net- 
works. 
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All that havingbeen said, the mission 
is very much worth the effort. Surely 
everyone involved can agree that it is 
critical that the emphasis must be on 
how to provide the best quality services 
in the requisite quantity to ensure that 
new Canadians can build their new 
lives and make the kind of constructive 
contributions to the society that so 
many refugees and immigrants have 
before. Challenges have always brought 
out the very best in the kinds of people 
who dedicate their time and talents to 
refugee services. 
However, in order to perform that 
mission in the contemporary environ- 
ment, it is important to recognize that 
the people and the individual organiza- 
tions are indeed parts of service net- 
works, that those networks have a 
variety of common characteristics and 
those characteristics in turn have con- 
sequences. Without losing sight of one's 
own objectives and those of the home 
organization, it is important to consider 
those networks and their consequences 
in the day-to-day challenge to welcome 
new Canadians. 
Those of us who have been in a posi- 
tion to learn so much from Canadian 
refugee service providers continue to 
watch and to learn as the dedicated 
public servants, NGO members, and 
individual providers meet these chal- 
lenges. 
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